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Abstract
This paper attempts to show the extent to which a faction of the Philippine technocracy 
during the martial law years utilized its social capital (used interchangeably with cultural 
capital) to become a potent economic bloc in society only to see it gradually depleted.Led by 
then Prime Minister and concurrent Finance Minister Cesar E.A. Virata, this bloc consisted 
of key senior economic officials who were closely associated with IMF-World Bank policies. 
Their social capital was founded on their family and educational backgrounds, paving the 
way for their acquisition of the technical expertise required by the business community 
and later, by government. What set them apart from the other pre-martial law technocrats 
was their support for an export-oriented and foreign investment-friendly industrialization 
policy shared by Marcos and the IMF-World Bank. The social capital of this bloc grew 
due to their ability to access foreign loans, gain international support, and function as a 
deterrent to corruption.Marcos, however,  proceeded to undermine this bloc’s capital by 
doing the following:  1)  limiting the Virata faction to the economic sphere and making 
sure it was not “politically-threatening”;  2)  “factionalizing” the technocracy resulting in 
non-Virata technocrats pursuing their own projects; and 3) and nurturing crony capitalism 
and corruption through Mrs. Marcos and his “chief cronies” to the detriment of the Virata 
faction’s economic policies.But despite the opportunity provided by the political and 
economic crisis of the early 1980s and initial IMF-WB support,the Virata-led bloc’s social 
capital rapidly deteriorated because of its inability to now access the needed loans and 
the withdrawal of US support for the Marcos dictatorship. This further highlighted the 
unsustainable and relative vulnerability of its social capital.
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introduction
MoSt of the literAture on technocrAcy focuses on its recruitment into 
government because of their expertise. It was this technical expertise which paved 
their way into the “power elite” of society.  In the Philippine experience, however, 
it is also significant to know how they acquired this. The manner in which their 
abilities were developed defines not only how they were recruited into government 
but also the nature of their political and economic leverage in the decision-making 
process. This is especially so in the case of Philippine technocracy which was 
perceived to be a faction of the “power elite” during the martial law period (1972-
1986), together with the other two: the military and the leadership’s relatives and 
cronies. Furthermore, although some of these technocrats possessed political and/
or economic traits that generally characterized the Philippine “power elite”—that 
is, coming from  a landed family and occupying a political place in government—
their government appointment was generally deemed based on merit as experts 
in their fields and they were perceived to be “apolitical.” Moreover, there were also 
technocrats who came from the middle and lower classes of society.     In the process, 
the paper hopes to fill up a gap in understanding the role of Philippine technocracy 
as a “power elite” not in the usual framework of contemporary development 
theories which Peter Evans (1997, 1) has argued has generally focused its attention 
on macro results. But also considering “micro-institutional foundations on which 
they depend.”  These generally refer to informal norms and networks which form 
the basis of social and cultural capital.
The paper draws its idea from Amir’s (2007) use of Pierre Bourdieu’s cultural 
concept in examining the reign of B.J. Habibie in New Order Indonesia which 
looked into the family and educational background of Habibie which brought him 
into the apex of power during the Suharto regime.  Thus, cultural capital refer 
to traits which emanate from a person which facilitates his/her entry into crucial 
networks in society.  Cultural capital is closely linked with social capital which 
is interchangeably linked as used by Bourdieu.  As Bourdieu pointed out, social 
capital refers to “the advantages and opportunities accruing to people through 
membership in certain communities.”  This is further expounded by Coleman who 
uses the term “to describe a resource of individuals that emerges from their social 
ties” and is based primarily in interpersonal relations (Woolcock 1998). Because of 
their closeness in meaning in the manner which these are utilized, this paper will 
use cultural and social capital interchangeably.
*This article is based on the research project of the author: “Social Origins of the Martial 
Law Technocrats: Paving the Path for Government Service.” This research project is 
funded by the Office of the Vice President for Academic Affairs through the University 
of the Philippines Research Grant, Creative and Research Scholarship Fund, 1 February 
2012 to 31 January 2013.
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This paper, therefore, examines the nature of the Filipino technocrats’ social 
capital which paved the way for their recruitment into the Marcos administration 
to become key economic players during that period.  It will highlight how the nature 
of technocracy’s cultural/social may help explain the character of its influence 
which paved the way to their key role in the martial law administration as a “power 
elite”.  It will, however, also show that the nature of their cultural/social capital was 
not enough to sustain their role as a power elite during the martial law period as it 
was gradually eroded by no less than the leadership.
The first part of the paper will, therefore, look into the family and educational 
backgrounds of the technocrats which laid the basis for their cultural capital which 
paved their way into the influential Philippine business community.  This further 
grew in the form of social capital, i.e., capital which grows from establishing 
relationships in communities  as will be seen in the second part. The third part, 
on the other hand, will show how technocracy’s cultural/social capital was further 
enhanced by their recruitment into government as particularly facilitated by 
their shared economic vision with the leadership and the country’s major lending 
institutions, i.e., the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, as 
will be discussed in the fourth part.  The fifth part, on the other hand, will highlight 
the limitations of technocracy’s cultural/social capital during the latter part of the 
martial law as seen in the manner in which the leadership debased this.  While 
the last part will focus on how the political and economic crisis has led to the 
expansion as well as the contraction of technocracy’s cultural/social capital.
This paper will focus mainly on the experiences of six technocrats who were 
the key senior economic officials of President Ferdinand E. Marcos and  who 
formed one major influential technocracy faction during the martial law regime 
which was referred to as the IMF/World Bank faction. This bloc was perceived 
to have the closest link with the country’s two major lending institutions.  The 
primus interpares of this faction was   Cesar E.A. Virata, former prime minister 
and minister of finance and the other technocrats identified with this faction 
were Vicente T. Paterno, former head of the Board of Investments and trade 
minister;Placido Mapa Jr., former Philippine alternative executive director to the 
World Bank; and Armand V. Fabella, former head of the Philippine Reorganization 
Commission, who are from the country’s landed elites and Jaime C. Laya, former 
budget minister and Central Bank governor who come from the middle class; and 
Manuel S. Alba, former budget minister who traces his origins from the lower class 
in Philippine society.  This paper benefits substantially from interviews conducted 
with key technocrats during the martial law period, under the three-year (2007-
2010) Japan Society for the Promotion of Science-sponsored research project, 
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“Economic Policy-making and the Philippine Development Experience, 1970-1985: 
An Oral History Project,” of which the author was a team member.1 
i. family and educational Backgrounds
The family backgrounds of the technocrats highlight two important factors that 
facilitated their recruitment into government service. First, it paved the way for their 
education that gave them the technical expertise needed by the government. As 
Pierre Bourdieu pointed out, cultural capital relating to family origins has a strong 
correlation with academic success later in life (Swartz 2007, 75-76).  Second, their 
networks or cultural capital enabled them to forge ties with people who recruited 
them into government. Together with the academic community, these were the 
closely intertwined communities where one witnessed the growth of technocracy’s 
cultural capital combining their scientific and professional credentials (Amir 2007, 
85).   In pure technocracy, technical knowledge would serve as the base of power, 
with education and training providing credentials for access to it. Those who 
rule would justify themselves by appealing only to technical expertise grounded 
in scientific forms of knowledge (Fischer 1990, 18). Such a technical expertise 
is generally acquired from education, and this is where the family backgrounds 
of the Philippine technocrats enabled them to acquire not only basic but, more 
important, higher education to obtain expertise in their fields. The technocrats, 
in general, refer to the scientists, including physicists, mathematicians, chemists, 
biologists, engineers, computer programmers, and others who work in varying 
degrees of applied or pure research.  For the Philippine technocrats, they had 
their undergraduate/graduate degrees in engineering, economics, and business 
administration and finance.
The key technocrats in the Marcos administration came from different classes 
in society. Placido Mapa Jr. seems to typify the technocrats who came from the 
upper class of Philippine society. He is a member of the Ledesma-Lizares-Alunan 
landed clan of Negros Occidental. In the 1950s, his mother’s family was considered 
part of the national landowning economic elite; the family controlled major 
nonmanufacturing firms in the list of the top 100 corporations in the 1970s (Rivera 
1994, 95). The Mapas were also members of the political elite. His grandfather 
served in the country’s National Assembly while his father was President Elpidio 
Quirino’s commerce and industry secretary. Vicente Paterno, on the other hand, 
typifies another type of landed elite whose wealth was augmented when his 
father,  who was a medical doctor, joined the family business of his brother-in-
law Vicente Madrigal whose family is part of the “prominent colonial landed elites 
who successfully diversified into manufacturing …” (Rivera 1994, 25). Like Paterno, 
1 The project team also tried to interview Marcos’s Economic Planning Minister Gerardo Sicat who was a key 
player in this technocracy faction  as he was Marcos’  Director-General of the National Economic and Development 
Authority,  but he was unavailable.
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Armand Fabella also hailed from a wealthy landed family from Pagsanjan, Laguna. 
His father was the first Filipino certified public accountant in the US and made 
good fortune from the US stock market.2 
It is Cesar E. A. Virata who seems to typify the Filipino technocrat who came 
from a middle-class background. Although his family owned land, he said that 
this was not much. For Virata, what pulled the family through was his father’s 
profession, that is, a math professor at the University of the Philippines (UP), 3 the 
national elite school.  Like Virata, Jaime Laya’s father, Juan Cabreros Laya, was also 
a  UP professor and renowned writer whose books included the popular textbook 
Diwang Kayumanggi.4 As for Manuel Alba Jr., his background shows how someone 
from the lower class could become a technocrat as he described himself as “very 
poor.” He came from a family of eleven children, and his father was a municipal 
treasurer, in the lower rank of the government bureaucracy.5 
Educational mobility.  Their education has generally classified technocracy as 
belonging to the middle class not because of “their class origins but as a result 
of having particular credentials and know-based expertise … The ‘mental’ work 
engaged in by the middle class usually requires a college education and often 
leads to the planning, supervision or direction of other people’s work” (Croteau 
1995, xii). Mapa is a product of the elite educational system in the Philippines—
that is, he went to the exclusive boy school of De La Salle for his elementary and 
secondary schooling; for college, he went to Ateneo de Manila. He proceeded to 
earn a master’s degree in economics in St. Louis University and later on proceeded 
to Harvard University to obtain a doctor’s degree in economics.6  Vicente Paterno 
had a similar educational background as Mapa: he also went to De La Salle for his 
secondary schooling. But for elementary, Paterno was a product of the Philippine 
public school system. Paterno pursued his university education in Ateneo de 
Manila, but when the school closed down because of the war in 1941, he continued 
at the University of the Philippines where he graduated in 1948 with a bachelor of 
science degree in mechanical engineering.7 Armand Fabella, on the other hand, 
2 Fabella, Armand V.  2008.  Interview by Yutaka Katayama, Cayetano Paderanga, Temario Rivera and Teresa S. 
Encarnacion Tadem.  Tape recording. August 11. Fabella Residence, Harvard St., Wack Wack Subdivision, Mandaluyong 
City, Philippines.
3 Virata, Cesar E.A. 2007.  Interview by Yutaka Katayama, Cayetano Paderanga and Teresa S. Encarnacion Tadem. 
Tape recording.  November 21.  RCBC Plaza, Makati City, Philippines.
4 Virata, Cesar E.A. 2007.  Interview by Yutaka Katayama, Cayetano Paderanga and Teresa S. Encarnacion Tadem. 
Tape recording.  November 21.  RCBC Plaza, Makati City, Philippines.
5 Alba, Manuel S.  2008.  Interview by Yutaka Katayama and Teresa S. Encarnacion Tadem.  Tape recording. 
December 12.  Third World Studies Center, Palma Hall, University of the Philippines, Diliman, Quezon City, Philippines.
6 Mapa, Placido.  2009.  Interview by Yutaka Katayama and Teresa S. Encarnacion Tadem. Tape recording.  March 
13, Metrobank Plaza, Gil Puyat Avenue, Makati City.
7 Paterno, Vicente T.  2008.  Interview by Yutaka Katayama, Temario Rivera and Teresa S. Encarnacion Tadem. 
Tape recording.   August 15.  11th Floor Columbia Tower Ortigas Ave., Mandaluyong City, Philippines.
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attended high school in the United States and obtained an undergraduate degree 
in economics from Harvard University.8 
As for Virata, he seems to typify the educational path of the middle class in 
Philippine society who was a product of the country’s public school system. He 
studied at the elementary and secondary schools of the University of the Philippines, 
with a year in high school at the Imus Institute. Alba, on the other hand, finished 
elementary in West Visayas State University in 1949, graduating valedictorian. He 
also graduated valedictorian from Iloilo National High School in 1953. As for Laya, 
he attended Alejandro Albert Elementary School in Dapitan and proceeded to 
Arellano High School in Manila.The educational background of these technocrats 
was crucial to their admission to the elite University of the Philippines.
Like his grandparents and parents, Laya went to the University of the Philippines 
where he finished with a Bachelor of Science in Business Administration (accounting; 
magna cum laude) in 1957.9 As for Virata, he obtained a BS Mechanical Engineering 
degree in 1952. In that year, he also graduated with a BS Business Administration 
degree, cum laude, from UP. Upon graduation, hejoined the UP College of Business 
Administration (CBA) as an instructor in 1952 and later on went on to become its 
Dean.10 Like Virata,  Laya also went  on to become faculty as well as dean at the UP 
CBA.  Virata’s and Laya’s family background depicts a middle class background but 
not the middle class from the bourgeoisie, which, as Anthony Giddens pointed out, 
is based on market capacity—that is, ownership of property. The Virata family was 
middle class owing to their possession of qualifications (Robison and Goodman 
1996, 12).
Alba seems to typify what Bourdieu observes as children coming from the lower 
class who are able to overcome the lack of cultural capital resource by adopting a 
flexible and open orientation toward the demands of an inherently middle-class 
educational system for which they are previously unprepared (Wacquant 2005, 
9). Alba’s public elementary and secondary schooling enabled him to study in 
UP where he obtained in 1957 a Bachelor of Science in Business Administration 
(accounting) degree from the University of the Philippines. After graduation he 
worked as assistant instructor at the UP CBA.11 
US education as a potent cultural capital.  Philippine technocracy was 
generally the product of US education. For those who could afford it like Mapa, 
Fabella, and Paterno, the choice was Harvard University. Unlike the UP-based 
technocrats, the more well-off technocrats were able to pursue graduate degrees 
8 Fabella, Armand V.  2008.  Interview by Yutaka Katayama, Cayetano Paderanga, Temario Rivera and Teresa S. 
Encarnacion Tadem.  Tape recording. August 11. Fabella Residence, Harvard St., Wack Wack Subdivision, Mandaluyong 
City, Philippines.
9 Laya, Jaime.  2009.  Interview by Yutaka Katayama, Cayetano Paderanga and Teresa S. Encarnacion Tadem. 
February 9. Tape recording.  1000 United Nations Avenue corner San Marcelino St., Ermita, Manila 1007, Philippines.
10 Virata, Cesar E.A. 2007.  Interview by Yutaka Katayama, Cayetano Paderanga and Teresa S. Encarnacion Tadem. 
Tape recording.  November 21.  RCBC Plaza, Makati City, Philippines.
11 Manuel S. Alba, biodata
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on their own. Paterno did this with financial assistance from his parents and his 
own personal savings working as a sugar mill engineer. He pursued a Master of 
Business Administration (MBA) at Harvard University in 1953.12 For Virata, Alba, 
and Laya, as UP faculty, they enjoyed the opportunity to study in the United States 
through US fellowships c/o UP.13 The US fellowships generally came from the Mutual 
Security Agency (MSA) fellowship, a precursor of the US Agency for International 
Development.14 In the case of Virata, he was given a fellowship to study at Wharton 
School, University of Pennsylvania where he obtained an MBA major in industrial 
management in 1953.  As for Alba, he pursued  a master of business administration 
(marketing and transportation) at the University of Minnesota in 1961. In 1967, 
he obtained his PhD in management science and business administration in 
Northwestern University, Chicago and Evanston, Illinois, USA.15  And for Laya, 
he pursued a master’s degree in industrial management from Georgia Institute of 
Technology in 1961 and doctor’s degree in financial management from Stanford 
University in 1966. Being US educated facilitated the technocrats’, who were 
coming from the middle- and lower classes,  entry into the elite-controlled business 
community. As pointed out by Bourdieu, this “shows how the school legitimates 
the dominant social order by naturalizing social differences through the ideology 
of ‘natural gifts’ or through the allocation of scholastic qualifications” (Poupeau 
2000, 71).
ii. expanding Social Capital through the Philippine 
Business Community
The importance of technocracy to the business community as facilitated by their 
educational backgrounds enhanced further its social capital. As noted, 
while financial, environmental, physical and human capital are vital to their community, 
the most critical capital of all is social capital. Social capital is the only one that you build 
by using. It refers to the ability of community members to work together. Without this, 
none of the other forms of capital can be developed to improve quality of life. Social 
capital enhances the benefits of investment in physical and human capital (Putnam 1993 
and Civic Practices Network 1996).
This was seen in the technocrats upon returning to the Philippines with 
graduate degrees in the early 1950s. The “first set” of martial law technocrats—
Fabella, Mapa, Virata, and Paterno—encountered “the emergence of a vibrant 
12 Paterno, Vicente T.  2008.  Interview by Yutaka Katayama, Temario Rivera and Teresa S. Encarnacion Tadem. 
Tape recording.   August 15.  11th Floor Columbia Tower Ortigas Ave., Mandaluyong City, Philippines.
13 Laya, Jaime.  2009.  Interview by Yutaka Katayama, Cayetano Paderanga and Teresa S. Encarnacion Tadem. 
February 9. Tape recording.  1000 United Nations Avenue corner San Marcelino St., Ermita, Manila 1007, Philippines.
14 Virata, Cesar E.A. 2007.  Interview by Yutaka Katayama, Cayetano Paderanga and Teresa S. Encarnacion Tadem. 
Tape recording.  November 21.  RCBC Plaza, Makati City, Philippines.
15 Manuel S. Alba, biodata
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manufacturing sector” and of Filipino entrepreneurs who were perceived to 
provide the foundation of Filipino industrial bourgeoisie, “projecting alternative 
strategies for development” (Rivera 1994 3).  Beginning in the 1950s and 1960s, too, 
“the closely held conglomerates of the major oligarchic families also became highly 
diversified units.” These families combined manufacturing, finance, agriculture, 
commerce, services, urban real estate, and other business interests, all under one 
roof (Hutchcroft 1998, 38). Among the families who took advantage of technocratic 
skills were the Lopezes  of the sugarcane plantation-owning family from Negros 
Occidental who hired Virata for their newspaper, The Manila Chronicle.  They 
generally wanted Virata to bring in his expertise on “time and motion” which 
he acquired in his graduate studies, to cut costs and bring more profits to the 
company.16 Paterno, like Virata, also worked for a company owned by the Lopezes 
in 1964, i.e., Meralco,  the country’s leading electric company. Lopez’s son, Eugenio 
Lopez Jr., was Paterno’s classmate in Harvard Business School.17 During the 1950s, 
the banking system was also actively recruiting graduates from the United States 
as this period also signaled “the rapid growth and development of a complex and 
comprehensive financial system” (Castro 1974, 23 & 26).  Mapa took advantage of 
this situation, and his first job was with the First National Citibank (now Citibank). 
18 Mapa also signified the technocrats coming from the upper landed classes whose 
families were diversifying into other businesses such as financing.
Technocrats and multinational corporations. The establishment or expansion 
of business ventures by the local elites included joint ventures with multinational 
corporations needing technocratic skills. Through the 1960s, for example, the 
“major elite segments and dominant families of the local manufacturing class 
were closely linked with foreign capital …” (Rivera 1994, 93).  A firm that linked 
the technocrats with multinational corporations was the accounting firm SyCip 
Gorres Velayo & Co. or SGV. Through SGV, Virata became a consultant for big 
multinational corporations like United Fruit Company and Castle & Cooke, 
which were exploring the agribusiness potential in the Philippines.19 Alba, who 
worked with SGV as a bookkeeper, on the other hand, did a physical inventory of 
re-dried tobacco in Cooperative Exchange, a company owned by Harry Stonehill 
in La Union.20 As for Paterno, although he did not work for a US multinational 
corporation, he was employed by a development agency that was a joint venture 
16 Virata, Cesar E.A.  2008.  Interview by Cayetano Paderanga and Teresa S. Encarnacion Tadem. Tape recording. 
30 September. RCBC Plaza, Makati City, Philippines.
17 Paterno, Vicente T.  2008.  Interview by Yutaka Katayama, Temario Rivera and Teresa S. Encarnacion Tadem. 
Tape recording.   August 15.  11th Floor Columbia Tower Ortigas Ave., Mandaluyong City, Philippines.
18 Mapa, Placido.  2009.  Interview by Yutaka Katayama and Teresa S. Encarnacion Tadem. Tape recording.  March 
13, Metrobank Plaza, Gil Puyat Avenue, Makati City.
19 Virata, Cesar E.A. 2007.  Interview by Yutaka Katayama, Cayetano Paderanga and Teresa S. Encarnacion Tadem. 
Tape recording.  19 December. RCBC Plaza, Makati City, Philippines.
20 Alba, Manuel S.  2008.  Interview by Yutaka Katayama and Teresa S. Encarnacion Tadem.  Tape recording. 
December 12.  Third World Studies Center, Palma Hall, University of the Philippines, Diliman, Quezon City, Philippines.
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of the US Agency for International Development (USAID) and the government’s 
National Economic Council (NEC).21 
The link of the academic and business communities.  Virata, Laya and Alba 
were all working as consultants for SGV while also holding a full-time job as UP CBA 
faculty. This signifies the importance of the technocrats to the business community 
whereby the similar nature of cultural capital and economic capital where both are 
very competitive and “whose scarcity and value could mean that cultural capital 
could be converted into a high commodity resource” (Fowler 2000, 2). The link 
between the academe and the business community also shows the coming together 
of two important capital: cultural (as expressed in the academe) and economic 
(as expressed in capital) (Wacquant 2005, 135).   Furthermore, as Bourdieu and 
Coleman pointed out, cultural capital which is also expressed as social capital, 
gives “advantages and opportunities to people through membership in certain 
communities” (Woolcock 1998, 154).  In the case of these technocrats,  one saw this 
in their role in the academic and  business communities.
iii. recruitment into government and the growth of 
Technocracy’s Social Capital
In all these communities, the technocrats’ were able to develop a key ingredient 
of  social capital which refers to “features of social organization such as networks, 
norms, and social trust that enable people and communities to work together” 
(Putnam 1993 and CPN 1996).  This paved the way for their inclusion into a third 
potent community in Philippine society, i.e., the government.  The entry of the 
technocrats in the 1950s and the 1960s into government came at a time when 
there was a dramatic increase of power of the central government due to its 
implementation of import and exchange controls. This enabled the government 
to “control the direction of the economy and to make or break individual 
entrepreneurs” (Hawes 1987, 34-35).Furthermore, the Philippine state played an 
“increasingly important role in the economy through both its financial institutions 
and commercial regulations.” This role started when it was the “distributor of US 
rehabilitation and reparation funds after World War II,” and “by the late 1950s, its 
role was so pronounced” (McCoy 1994, 13).  Given this context, what made the 
technocrats more attractive to government was the potency of the marriage of 
cultural and economic capital as exemplified by Mapa. Coming from a wealthy 
landowning family, Mapa acquired the technical expertise that allowed him to 
negotiate further the higher echelons not only of the business community but 
also of government not solely on familial or patrimonial ties but on merit as well. 
Like his grandfather and father, Mapa wanted a job in government and thus from 
21 Virata, Cesar E.A. 2007.  Interview by Yutaka Katayama, Cayetano Paderanga and Teresa S. Encarnacion Tadem. 
Tape recording.  November 21.  RCBC Plaza, Makati City, Philippines.
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Citibank he joined the government economic agency Program Implementation 
Agency (PIA) under Armand Fabella who was the director-general. His recruitment 
into the Macapagal administration was facilitated by his family network care of 
Rufino “Feny” Hechanova who was his cousin and who was President Diosdado 
Macapagal’s Secretary of Trade and Industry.22 Mapa also personally knew Marcos’s 
1965 presidential campaign manager and later on executive secretary Rafael 
“Paeng” Salas as both their fathers were members of the Liberal Party. Mapa’s father 
also had ties with politicians in the Nacionalista Party who were part of Marcos’s 
group.23  Mapa’s family background seems to depict the nature of elite families 
during that period who devote enormous resources “to the task of gaining and 
maintaining access to the political machinery …” (Hutchcroft 1998, 41). Mapa’s 
entry into government also typifies the role of members of the landowning elites 
who have expanded into business and who also entered government.  This was 
particularly true of those coming from the country’s landowning sugar elites.  An 
example was the National Economic Council (NEC) chair Alfredo Montelibano Sr. 
who was “a sugar baron and industrialist as well as a politician”   (Raquiza 2012, 74). 
What marked a major difference between the previous land-owning technocrats 
and the middle-class martial law technocrats like Virata, Alba, and Laya, was that 
they were pulled to government service mainly because of their technical expertise 
and they generally came from the academe.   But like the technocrats also coming 
from the upper class, what also brought them in were their networks. If the landed 
technocrats had their family, economic and political networks, the middle class 
martial law technocrats had their academic network, i.e., UP.  As Coleman pointed 
out, social capital is used “to describe a resource of individuals that emerges from 
their social ties and is based primarily in interpersonal relations” (Woolcock 
1998, 156;  Portes and Landolt 1996, 2).   This can be seen in the other technocrat’s 
experiences.  Virata’s entry into government was because of Salas who was the UP 
vice president under UP President Carlos P. Romulo.  Virata said that he knew Salas 
because they both belonged to UP’s Pan Xenia Fraternity.  When Marcos won the 
presidency in 1965, Salas asked Virata to join the Transition Committee on Finance 
and the Committee on Agriculture. His full-time offer to join government came in 
February 1967 where Virata was assigned to the Presidential Economic Staff (PES).24 
As for Alba, it was UP professor Corpuz, a PhD of political science graduate 
from Harvard University, who brought him into government service. Corpuz was 
also considered a “technocrat” whose skills and training is in political science and 
not economics.  Alba met Corpuz when the latter taught in UP Iloilo when Alba 
was still in secondary school. Corpuz went on to head the Development Academy 
22 Mapa, Placido.  2009.  Interview by Yutaka Katayama, Cayetano Paderanga, Temario Rivera and Teresa S. 
Encarnacion Tadem. Tape recording.  March 27, Metrobank Plaza, Gil Puyat Avenue, Makati City.
23  Mapa, Placido.  2009.  Interview by Yutaka Katayama and Teresa S. Encarnacion Tadem. Tape recording.  March 
13, Metrobank Plaza, Gil Puyat Avenue, Makati City.
24 Virata, Cesar E.A. 2007.  Interview by Yutaka Katayama and Teresa S. Encarnacion Tadem. Tape recording. 
November 23.  RCBC Plaza, Makati City, Philippines.
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of the Philippines (DAP), which served as a training ground for career bureaucrats 
and where Alba served as a founding director from 1971 to 1973.25 As for Paterno, 
he joined the government when Virata and Mapa offered him to head the Board 
of Investments (BOI), which was just a year old.26  Virata and Paterno were both 
undergraduate contemporaries in the UP College of Engineering and they were 
together in UP when Paterno was a lecturer at the UP CBA before entering 
government service. As to Laya, he was recruited into government service during 
the martial law period when National Economic and Development Authority 
(NEDA) Director-General Gerardo Sicat Jr. invited him to join the agency in 1974 
as his deputy.27 Sicat, on the other hand, was invited by Virata to join him in the 
PES.  Sicat at that time was a faculty of the UP School of Economics.  He and Virata 
are fraternity brothers in UP’s Pan Xenia.
iV. Shared economic Vision with the leadership
As important, however, as the family, academic and business links which 
facilitated the martial law technocrats’ entry into government was their shared 
economic vision with the leadership.  That is, the relevance of the technocrats to 
Marcos can be seen in the context of how technocracy is viewed to support a political 
project that advocates experts as the dominant basis for organizing political power 
(Fischer 1990, 18). The technocrats whom Marcos favored shared with him the 
vision of an economy open to foreign investments. Mapa, for example, believes that 
aside from his political connections, another reason why Marcos retained him in 
government was that the president preferred the five-year development plan of the 
PES team headed by Armand Fabella, of which Mapa was part, to that of the NEC 
development plan. Mapa felt that Marcos did not like the NEC plan because it was 
too protectionist and nationalistic whereas the PES plan emphasized the need for 
foreign investments.28 Such a view was also generally shared by the other martial 
law technocrats. The clash between the PIA (which later on became the PES) 
and the NEC, which was headed by Filemon Rodriguez and later on by Hilarion 
Henares, was well known. Henares is a Doctor of Economics and is a graduate of 
Ateneo de Manila, University of the Philippines and the Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology.29 When martial law was declared, Marcos retained the technocrats 
in the PES. These technocrats were already at that time working closely with the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF).30 
25  Manuel S. Alba, Biodata.
26 Paterno, Vicente T.  2008.  Interview by Yutaka Katayama, Temario Rivera and Teresa S. Encarnacion Tadem. 
Tape recording.   August 15.  11th Floor Columbia Tower Ortigas Ave., Mandaluyong City, Philippines.
27 Laya, Jaime.  2009. Interview by Yutaka Katayama, Cayetano Paderanga and Teresa S. Encarnacion Tadem. 
February 9. Tape recording.  1000 United Nations Avenue corner San Marcelino St., Ermita, Manila 1007, Philippines.
28 Laya, Jaime.  2009.  Interview by Yutaka Katayama, Cayetano Paderanga and Teresa S. Encarnacion Tadem. 
February 9. Tape recording.  1000 United Nations Avenue corner San Marcelino St., Ermita, Manila 1007, Philippines.
29 http://www.untvweb.com/hosts/larry-henares/ Downloaded on December 20, 2012.
30 Mapa, Placido.  2009.  Interview by Yutaka Katayama, Cayetano Paderanga, Temario Rivera and Teresa S. 
Encarnacion Tadem. Tape recording.  March 27, Metrobank Plaza, Gil Puyat Avenue, Makati City.
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Mapa’s  perspective was already evident in his doctoral dissertation topic which 
was inspired by his favorite economics professor Evsey Domar who created the 
Domar model.  Mapa said that the heart and analytical part of his dissertation 
was the expansion of Domar’s model, i.e., the investment multiplier model, except 
that this was for a closed economy.  What Mapa did was to put  in a coefficient 
for an open economy and this would take foreign exchange into account.31  As for 
Virata, Laya, Alba and Paterno,  they did not see foreign investors as competitors 
as they did not own any local business and they even worked as consultants for 
multinational corporations. For Alba, his education also made him receptive to 
the American free enterprise system.  He said that he was very much influenced 
by his doctoral dissertation adviser Philipp Kotler who he considers as the guru of 
marketing. 32 As for Virata, he pointed out that his appreciation for liberalization 
was when he observed that after the war, the boom and bust cycles of the Philippine 
economy was not getting the country anywhere. He saw the solution to this in 
developing exports which he witnessed  as an SGV consultant to Taiwan, Japan and 
Korea.33 The leadership’s support for this development perspective was further seen 
when Virata brought into the PES Sicat who at that time was all set to join the Yale 
Economic Growth Center. Sicat, who has a PhD in Economics from Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology, was a strong advocate of an export-led industrialization 
and all-out liberalization of the economy.  Sicat was a disciple of Gustav Ranis, 
an American economist who preached this (Lichauco 1981, 78).  The entry of 
these technocrats into government, therefore, highlights the extent to which they 
have used their educational assets in a competitive game of power (Fowler 2000, 
14) —that is, their being able to ease out a set of technocrats from the NEC who 
had a different economic vision of development. Such an economic vision for 
the leadership seemed to provide the panacea for the country’s development at a 
time when “the import-substitution strategy ran aground with significantly lower 
growth rates in the late 1960s” (Bello 2004, 9).
V. The limitations of Technocracy’s Cultural/Social 
Capital during the Martial law regime
The first part of this paper therefore showed how technocracy’s cultural and social 
capital paved their way into government service given their family, educational and 
business networks. But it also showed was what mattered too was that they shared 
the same economic vision as the leadership over other technocrats who had the 
31 Mapa, Placido.  2009.  Interview by Yutaka Katayama, Cayetano Paderanga, Temario Rivera and Teresa S. 
Encarnacion Tadem. Tape recording.  March 27, Metrobank Plaza, Gil Puyat Avenue, Makati City.
32 Alba, Manuel S.  2008.  Interview by Yutaka Katayama and Teresa S. Encarnacion Tadem.  Tape recording. 
December 12.  Third World Studies Center, Palma Hall, University of the Philippines, Diliman, Quezon City, Philippines.
33 Virata, Cesar E.A.  2008.  Interview by Cayetano Paderanga, Temario Rivera and Teresa S. Encarnacion Tadem. 
Tape recording.  29 July.  RCBC Plaza, Makati City, Philippines.
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similar qualifications but had a different development perspective from Marcos. 
This section, however, will highlight the limitations of technocracy’s social capital 
as a power base vis-à-vis the new power relations under an authoritarian regime. 
As pointed out, social capital is the only capital that accumulates and grows through 
constant usage. Furthermore, “it is a moral resource whose supply increases rather 
than decreases through use and which (unlike physical capital) becomes depleted 
if not used”  (Putnam 1993 and Civic Practices Network 1996). This section will 
highlight the manner in which technocracy’s cultural/social capital was enhanced 
under and authoritarian regime as well as the manner in which it was also minimized.
To a certain extent the nature of the Virata faction’s cultural capital grew during 
the martial law period because of the similar vision they had with the IMF/World 
Bank which opened the door for foreign assistance to the country, something which 
the leadership wanted.   These technocrats would, thus, head the key economic 
agencies of the martial law administration with Secretary of Finance, Virata as 
the primus interpares of the technocrats associated with the “IMF/World Bank 
bloc”.  Virata and Mapa, in particular,  dealt with economic and financial matters 
pertaining to trade negotiations, representations in the World Bank and the IMF 
and Consultative Group meetings.34 The Consultative Group consisted of the major 
donor countries like the United States, and Japan and multilateral institution. Its 
membership, embodies the hegemonic ideology advanced by corporate/finance 
capital which has been called “corporate liberalism” (Heffren 1985, 173-174). Thus 
the entry of technocracy into the martial law regime was marked by two crucial 
sources of social capital emanating from Marcos and the IMF/World Bank.  
This growth however was only to a certain extent as  Marcos ultimately stymied 
this technocracy faction’s social capital. That is, it undermined the critical role of 
their social capital in pursuing “sustainable growth, good governance and social 
integration and harmony” (Putnam 1993, 169 and Civic Practices Network 1996, 6). 
This was seen in the following manner:
 
A.  GettinG rid of the “technopolS”
Marcos generally chose technocrats whose cultural and social capital, i.e., political 
and economic networks, were not threatening to him.  None of the  President’s 
key economic officials were part of Marcos’ inner circle which planned martial 
law. As Virata pointed out,  he did not have any knowledge of the preparations 
for martial law. He said that it was sort of a surprise to him.35 This was the same 
reaction of Alba, Laya, Paterno and Mapa.  Under the martial law regime, Marcos 
in general did not allow technocracy’s social capital to go beyond the economic 
34 Virata, Cesar E.A. 2007.  Interview by Yutaka Katayama and Cayetano 
Paderanga.  Tape recording.  December 13. RCBC Plaza, Makati City, Philippines.
35 Virata, Cesar E.A. 2007.  Interview by Yutaka Katayama and Cayetano Paderanga.  Tape recording.  December 
13. RCBC Plaza, Makati City, Philippines.
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sphere. The technocrats were very much aware of this and they acknowledged that 
the implementation of martial rule was under the Secretary of Defense Juan Ponce 
Enrile and the Office of the President.36 For Virata, his major task, where Marcos 
gave him a free hand, was to supervise and/or coordinate with the government’s 
financial institutions such as the Central Bank, the Budget Commission and other 
agencies needed for budgetary, fiscal and monetary matters.37 
For technocrats who were politically threatening. Marcos got rid of them as in 
the case of his two Executive Secretaries Salas and Alejandro Melchor who were 
regarded as a “technopols”, i.e., political technicians or strategists. Marcos viewed 
Salas as some form of political threat, particularly for the presidency.38 Salas 
during that time was hailed as the “rice czar” for improving rice production in the 
country. He was also well-connected as he came from the landowning elite and his 
first cousin was Roberto Benedicto, who was considered as one of Marcos’ “chief 
cronies”. As noted by Horacio “Boy” Morales, who worked closely with Salas and by 
Corpuz, Marcos was not the type of person who was willing to take chances even 
with the best and the brightest.39 When Salas saw that Marcos was lukewarm to  his 
political ambition in running for the Senate, he  left the government to become the 
Executive Director of the newly-established United Nations Fund for Population 
Activities (UNFPA) in 1969.  
As for Melchor who succeeded Salas and was a U.S. Annapolis graduate, Virata 
described him as an action man and very efficient and was able to size up problems 
easily.  But Virata thought that the President was not too comfortable about him 
because he came from the military and he was building around him a number 
of military officers as his assistants.40 Marcos thus abolished the  Office of the 
Executive Secretary and Melchor was purged and sent to the Asian Development 
Bank (ADB) as the country’s executive director.41 Salas and Melchor were two 
technocrats who had close relationships with members of the Virata faction.
36 Virata, Cesar E.A. 2008.  Interview by Yutaka Katayama, Cayetano Paderanga and Teresa S. Encarnacion Tadem. 
Tape recording.  June 24.  RCBC Plaza, Makati City, Philippines.
37 Virata, Cesar E.A. 2008.  Interview by Cayetano Paderanga and Teresa S. Encarnacion Tadem.  Tape recording. 
June 16.  RCBC Plaza, Makati City, Philippines.
38 Alba, Manuel S.  2008.  Interview by Yutaka Katayama and Teresa S. Encarnacion Tadem.  Tape recording. 
December 12.  Third World Studies Center, Palma Hall, University of the Philippines, Diliman, Quezon City, Philippines; 
Virata, Cesar E.A. 2008.  Interview by Cayetano Paderanga and Teresa S. Encarnacion Tadem.  Tape recording.  16 June. 
RCBC Plaza, Makati City, Philippines;  Corpuz, Onofre D.  2008.  Interview by Yutaka Katayama, Cayetano Paderanga 
and Teresa S. Encarnacion Tadem.  Tape recording. January 25, Corpuz Residence, U.P. Professor’s Village, Tandang 
Sora, Quezon City, Philippines.
39  Morales, Horacio “Boy” Jr. 2009.  Interview by Yutaka Katayama, Cayetano Paderanga and Teresa S. Encarnacion 
Tadem. Tape recording. August 14. Third World Studies Center Office, Palma Hall, University of the Philippines, 
Diliman, Quezon City; and Corpuz, Onofre D.  2008.  Interview by Yutaka Katayama, Cayetano Paderanga and Teresa 
S. Encarnacion Tadem.  Tape recording. January 25, Corpuz Residence, U.P. Professor’s Village, Tandang Sora, Quezon 
City, Philippines.
40 Virata, Cesar E.A. 2007.  Interview by Yutaka Katayama and Cayetano Paderanga.  Tape recording.  December 
13. RCBC Plaza, Makati City, Philippines.
41 Virata, Cesar E.A. 2008.  Interview by Yutaka Katayama, Cayetano Paderanga and Teresa S. Encarnacion Tadem. 
Tape recording.  June 24.  RCBC Plaza, Makati City, Philippines.
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B. “fActionAlizAtion” of technocrAcy’S SociAl cApitAl42 
Asides from limiting the Virata faction’s social capital to the economic sphere, 
Marcos further depleted this by “factionalizing” his technocracy.  A consequence 
of this was the emergence of non-Virata technocrats who pursued their own 
development projects with the support of the leadership. This weakened the 
economic policy-making leverage of the Virata bloc.  This was seen the case of 
its  relationship with two other technocrats, Roberto V. Ongpin and Geronimo Z. 
Velasco.   These two technocrats also shared the economic vision of the IMF/World 
Bank technocracy bloc, but had their own particular “cultural capital” which gave 
them  their own direct access to Marcos.  Ongpin, who served as Marcos’ Minister 
of Trade and Industry  traces his lineage to the prominent Don Roman Ongpin 
clan of Manila’s Chinatown in Binondo, the country’s former premier commercial 
district in the early 1900s (Joaquin 1990, 13).  Like Manila’s elite, Ongpin studied in 
Ateneo de Manila and obtained an MBA from Harvard University.  Before joining 
government, he was Virata’s deputy in SGV where he later on went to become 
a  partner.43 Ongpin seemed to provide Marcos with the connection he needed 
with the country’s potent Chinese business community.  He replaced Paterno as 
Minister of Trade in 1979,  resulting into the change in policies of the Board of 
Investments (BOI) which was previously headed by his predecessor.44 There was 
the union of the Ministries of Trade and Industry into one and the downgrading 
of the BOI. Furthermore, Ongpin preferred big industrial developments, e.g., the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nation’s (ASEAN) 11 industrial projects.  Mapa 
as well as Alba observed that Ongpin had a big say on industrial policies during 
Marcos time.45 Virata did not approve of such a policy.46
As for Velasco, he served as Marcos’ Minister of Energy from 1977 to 1986.  Like 
Virata, Velasco obtained an MBA from the Wharton School of the University of 
Pennsylvania. He also served as the Chairman and President of the Philippine 
National Oil Company from 1973 to 1986.  Velasco’s background seemed to 
provide a particular cultural capital which were not present with the other Marcos’ 
technocrats. That is, he was a very successful businessman and before entering 
government, “the country’s highest-paid executive, whether Filipino or foreign” 
(Velasco 2006, x). At 34 years old, he was president of Republic Glass Company and 
president of the multinational agribusiness firm DOLE  Co. (Philippines) (Velasco 
2006, x). Virata also pointed out that Velasco was employed by the Standard 
42 See Tadem, Teresa S. Encarnacion S.  2012.  Virata:  The trials and tribulations of a “chief technocrat”. Philippine 
Political Science Journal 33 (1): 23-37.
43 Virata, 21 November 2007 Virata, Cesar E.A. 2007.  Interview by Yutaka Katayama, Cayetano Paderanga and 
Teresa S. Encarnacion Tadem. Tape recording.  November 21.  RCBC Plaza, Makati City, Philippines.
44 Paterno, Vicente T.  2008.  Interview by Yutaka Katayama, Temario Rivera and Teresa S. Encarnacion Tadem. 
Tape recording.   August 15.  11th Floor Columbia Tower Ortigas Ave., Mandaluyong City, Philippines.
45 Mapa, Placido.  2009.  Interview by Yutaka Katayama, Cayetano Paderanga and Teresa S. Encarnacion Tadem. 
Tape recording. April 22.  Metrobank Plaza, Gil Puyat Avenue, Makati City.
46 Virata, Cesar E.A.  2008.  Interview by Cayetano Paderanga, Temario Rivera and Teresa S. Encarnacion Tadem. 
Tape recording.  29 July.  RCBC Plaza, Makati City, Philippines.
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Vacuum Oil Company (Stanvac) before the break up of Esso and Mobil.47   His 
networks in the energy sector seemed to provide what Marcos needed during that 
time as he was recruited at the height of the oil crisis in 1973(Velasco 2006, x).  The 
Virata faction had no control over the country’s energy policies as this was generally 
determined by Velasco and the leadership.  Marcos factionalization of technocracy, 
therefore, did not provide the needed social integration and harmony which allows 
social capital to grow (Putnam 1993, 167 and Civic Practices Network 1996).
c. crony cApitAliSM AS AdverSe SociAl cApitAl
A third way by which Marcos undermined the social capital of the Virata faction 
was through the nurturing of crony capitalism.  Moreover, Marcos’ relationship 
with his cronies highlighted the negative traits of social capital.  That is, social 
capital which nurtured patronage and forms of vertical and hierarchical networks. 
(Putnam 1993, 173, Civic Practices Network 1996, Woolcock 1998, 271). As noted 
by Conrado “Jolly” Benitez, a technocrat closely identified with the First Lady Mrs. 
Imelda Marcos, the president in general had his own people in various economic 
sectors in society which were out of the hands of technocracy.48 In relation to this, 
the technocrats observed that Marcos’  left key industries in the Philippines like the 
coconut and sugar industries, the country’s top two major export earners during 
that time,  in the hands of his “chief cronies”, i.e., Eduardo “Danding” Cojuangco 
and Roberto S. Benedicto, respectively.  Virata said Marcos would not discuss 
the coconut industry with him as well as the involvement of Cojuangco.  What 
Virata knew was that this concept of controlling the coconut industry came from a 
study prepared by Ongpin when he was still with SGV.49 Virata also felt that Enrile 
was also quite close to Cojuangco. For Virata, for the things that the  Department 
of Finance (DOF) had no control, he just left it in the hands of  the groups that 
managed them as was the case of these two industries.50 As for  Benedicto, he 
was Marcos’ classmate and fraternity brother at the UP College of Law.  He was 
considered as one of the earliest and the most trusted cronies of  Marcos (Manapat 
1991, 100). Virata pointed out that sugar was out of the hands of their technocratic 
group and it was Benedicto who was in-charge of this.51 In particular, sugar trading 
was set up to go  through NASUTRA (National Sugar Trading Corporation) which 
47 Virata, Cesar E.A. 2007.  Interview by Yutaka Katayama, Cayetano Paderanga and Teresa S. Encarnacion Tadem. 
Tape recording.  19 December. RCBC Plaza, Makati City, Philippines.
48 Benitez, Jose Conrado.  2009.  Interview by Yutaka Katayama and Teresa S. Encarnacion Tadem.  Tape recording. 
August 7.  Philippine Women’s University, 1743 Taft Avenue, Manila, Philippines.
49 Virata, Cesar E.A. 2007.  Interview by Yutaka Katayama, Cayetano Paderanga and Teresa S. Encarnacion Tadem. 
Tape recording.  November 28.  RCBC Plaza, Makati City, Philippines.
50 Virata, Cesar E.A. 2008.  Interview by Yutaka Katayama, Cayetano Paderanga and Teresa S. Encarnacion Tadem. 
Tape recording.  June 24.  RCBC Plaza, Makati City, Philippines.
51 Virata, Cesar E.A. 2007.  Interview by Yutaka Katayama, Cayetano Paderanga and Teresa S. Encarnacion Tadem. 
Tape recording.  November 28.  RCBC Plaza, Makati City, Philippines.
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was headed by Benedicto.52 The NASUTRA experience is an example how Marcos 
is able to create conflict among members of a wealthy sugar landowning family. As 
Mapa pointed out, Benedicto’s monopoly of NASUTRA was very unpopular with 
his family and relatives53 but he (Mapa) could not do anything about it.  
Depletion of socialcapital and the First Lady.  The social capital of the Virata 
faction was further depleted as a moral resource, i.e., a resource which is able to 
help establish good relations within a community (Putnam 1993, 169). This was 
because of  its difficulty of curtailing the excesses of the First Lady Mrs. Imelda 
Marcos. Alba pointed out that Mrs. Marcos generally left it to her trusted people 
like Benitez to talk to him when they needed money.  But he also said that once 
in awhile, Marcos would tell him when they were both alone that if  the First Lady 
has some requests, to let him (Marcos) know.  Alba said that in general, he would 
always consult with Marcos but at the end of the day, Alba recognized the power 
of Mrs. Marcos in getting what she wanted being the wife of the President.54 Mapa 
also observed that to some extent, Virata would try to talk to Marcos about the 
private sector’s concern of having an “equal playing field” but he would not always 
get what he wanted. In some instances, he said that he and Virata  were in collision 
course with Mrs. Marcos.55 
Vi.  Crisis and the expansion and Contraction of 
Technocracy’s Social Capital 
One, therefore, has a situation as pointed out by Danny Unger (1998), in his 
study of social capital in Thailand, of an “embedded state perspective,” whereby 
state officials often utilize the “resources of social groups and authority structures 
to enhance their power (thereby) harnessing the organizational endowments of 
society to their own ends.”Under such circumstances, therefore, the Virata faction’s 
social capital could not grow and there was the threat of its depletion due to the 
absence of constant usage (Putnam 1993, 169 and Civic Practices Network 1996). 
It’s social capital was, however, not static as it was also shaped by the dynamics 
between the Virata faction and the leadership as well as his cronies and Mrs. 
Marcos as seen in the following manner:
52 Virata, Cesar E.A. 2008.  Interview by Yutaka Katayama, Cayetano Paderanga and Teresa S. Encarnacion Tadem. 
Tape recording.  May 2.  RCBC Plaza, Makati City, Philippines. 
53 Mapa, Placido.  2009.  Interview by Yutaka Katayama and Teresa S. Encarnacion Tadem. Tape recording.  March 
13, Metrobank Plaza, Gil Puyat Avenue, Makati City.
54 Alba, Manuel S.  2009.  Interview by Yutaka Katayama, Cayetano Paderanga and Teresa S. Encarnacion Tadem. 
Tape recording.  January 23.  December Third World Studies Center, Palma Hall, University of the Philippines, Diliman, 
Quezon City, Philippines.
55 Mapa, Placido.  2009.  Interview by Yutaka Katayama and Teresa S. Encarnacion Tadem. Tape recording.  March 
13, Metrobank Plaza, Gil Puyat Avenue, Makati City.
Tadem / Social Captial and the Martial Law Technocracy 87
Kritika Kultura 20 (2013): –094 © Ateneo de Manila University
<http://kritikakultura.ateneo.net>
One way by which the Virata faction built on its social capital was to  assert its leverage 
under the martial law regime through its vital linkage with the IMF/World Bank. This 
was seen when Virata was confronted with proposals of relatively large projects like the 
petrochemicals venture proposed by Velasco and the steel mill and the blast furnace 
scheme of Ongpin. Virata said that he argued against these capital-intensive projects 
as there was no way the country could finance this given its thin reserves.56 This was 
part of Ongpin’s push for the country to support the ASEAN project on 11 industrial 
project which Marcos wanted.  This project, however, did not push through because the 
World Bank did not adhere to this scheme and the regime could not acquire the needed 
foreign loans to finance this (Lichauco 1973, 107). The Virata faction would receive 
further support from the IMF/World Bank in the late 1970s in combating corruption 
and obstacles to implementing their economic policies. This was initially seen  in the 
appointment of Virata as Prime Minister by Marcos when the president moved to 
convene the Interim Batasan Pambansa (National Assembly) in 1978. This was  to pave 
the way for a French model presidential-parliamentary system and the lifting of Martial 
Law in 1981.  Such a move  surprised Virata because he knew that members of the ruling 
party Kilusang Bagong Uno (KBL)or New Society Movement, wanted the First Lady to 
be the Prime Minister.57 Moreover, the  regimes’ cronies led by Mrs. Marcos did not take 
kindly to the leadership’s accommodation of technocracy’s increased power even though 
a great part of this was nominal in nature.  They believed that a technocrat-dominated 
Cabinet would usher in a tighter hold on their activities by the IMF and the World Bank 
group whose policies were not popular with them (Bowring and Sacerdoti 1983, 54). The 
widespread perception was that these two multilateral agencies  pressured Marcos to lift 
martial law and declare a New Republic in 1981 headed by a Cabinet composed of World 
Bank  technocrats led by Virata.  This was one by which the IMF/World Bank felt that 
a “technocratic-led” Cabinet would keep in check crony monopoly of vital industries in 
the country which has warded off potential foreign investors in the Philippines because 
of the absence of competition and “free enterprise” (Bello et.al. 1982, 184).What gave 
further boost to technocracy’s clout was the 1981 economic crisis as spawned by the oil 
crisis due to the Iran-Iraq war among others.  This led Marcos to rely on Virata and his 
team to access the needed loans from the IMF/World Bank for the country.  Although 
Virata succeeded to accomplish his mission, this was done with great difficulty as efforts 
to get financial support from the donor countries and agencies was further stymied with 
the global economic crisis. Further aggravating this was the assassination of Marcos’s 
chief political foe ex-Senator Benigno S. Aquino on August 21, 1983.58 
56 Virata, Cesar E.A. 2007.  Interview by Yutaka Katayama, Cayetano Paderanga and Teresa S. Encarnacion Tadem. 
Tape recording.  19 December. RCBC Plaza, Makati City, Philippines and  Virata, Cesar E.A.  2008.  Interview by 
Cayetano Paderanga and Teresa S. Encarnacion Tadem. Tape recording.  30 September. RCBC Plaza, Makati City, 
Philippines.
57 Virata, Cesar E.A. 2008.  Interview by Yutaka Katayama, Cayetano Paderanga and Teresa S. Encarnacion Tadem. 
Tape recording.  May 28.  RCBC Plaza, Makati City, Philippines.
58 Virata, Cesar E.A. 2008.  Interview by Yutaka Katayama, Cayetano Paderanga and Teresa S. Encarnacion Tadem. 
Tape recording.  June 24.  RCBC Plaza, Makati City, Philippines.
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The possibilities of social capital expansion in times of crisis.  The economic 
and political crisis in general however gave the opportunity for the social capital 
of the IMF/World Bank technocrats to grow as they attempted to clamp down on 
crony capitalism.   Virata, for example, narrated that in 1984, there was a bank run 
led by Aquino’s widow, Corazon, of all the state- and/or crony-owned banks such 
as Philippine National Bank (PNB) and  the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB). 
Because of this,  Marcos issued out a decree stating that the Central Bank shall be 
obligated to restore the funds to the Bank brought about by the rallies. This meant 
that if these crony-owned banks lost dollars, the government needed to restore 
it.  Virata and Central Bank Governor Jose Fernandez successfully  prevailed on 
Marcos to rescind this as this had no parallel or precedent in international law. 
Virata believed that the one who crafted the decree was the group of Cojuangcowho 
at that time was UCPB chairman.59 
The growth of the Virata faction’s social capital under such a situation also 
emphasizes the importance of the role of the leadership, particularly, through 
state intervention which “sometimes destroys developmentally promising social 
networks and undermines developmentally useful social norms” (Evans 1990, 4). 
What emerges here is technocracy’s reliance  on Marcos to sustain the nature of 
their social capital by “creating a more even balance among contending parties… as 
a precondition for developing forms of collaboration based on increased trust and 
recognition of legitimate interests” (Evans 1990, 205). This was further seen when 
Marcos was caught between the interests of his cronies and relatives and that of 
the IMF/World Bank technocrats during a  KBL caucus in 1983  when the president 
did not lift a finger to stop the unrelenting attack against the local technocracy by 
members of the ruling party led by Mrs. Marcos, Benedicto, and his Minister of 
Labor Blas Ople who aired their frustration against the technocrats.  They felt that 
the technocratic policies, e.g.,  IMF/World Bank structural adjustment programs 
(SAPs), stood in the way of their personal projects and interests.  Taking into 
consideration the coming 1984 elections, Marcos also regarded this as a means “to 
allow the party leaders to stand up for whatever parochial interest they represented 
and, more importantly, to find a scapegoat for the country’s economic inefficiency” 
(Bowring and Sacerdoti 1983, 64). The realization, however, that the regime cannot 
survive without IMF/WB loans and that the technocrats are indispensable (since 
only they can assure the country of financial assistance from international lenders), 
pressured Marcos to come out with a statement saying that “the KBL central 
committee since 1972 has always reviewed all policies and programs adopted by the 
Party but which are now claimed by new managers”. This was his way of signaling 
to the party members to stop their attacks on the technocrats (Rocamora 1983, 6). 
59 Virata, Cesar E.A. 2008.  Interview by Cayetano Paderanga, Temario Rivera and Teresa S. Encarnacion Tadem. 
Tape recording.  29 July.  RCBC Plaza, Makati City, Philippines.
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Loss of the business community’s support.  But the Virata faction also fell 
short of addressing the inequalities whereby “norms and networks that serve some 
groups may obstruct others, particularly if the norms are discriminatory or the 
networks socially segregated” (Portes and Landolt 1996, 3). This was seen during 
this period whereby the reforms taken by technocracy, were not enough to convince 
the business community in particular and the Philippine public in general that 
technocracy had the clout and even the political will to control crony capitalism. 
The business community for example, viewed the technocrats as covering up for 
crony corporations in the  light of the 1983 Philippine economic crisis which led to 
the rapid downfall of more enterprises, majority of which were owned by Marcos 
cronies. To prevent the economy from falling apart, the technocrats stepped in 
to salvage some of these crony corporations (Galang, 1981).  Thus, an important 
source of social capital which the Virata faction established during the pre-martial 
law period was lost.
The limitations of IMF/World Bank support. The economic clout of the 
Virata faction was further severed when it could not access all the needed financial 
assistance from the IMF/World Bank.  A reason was because the hands of these 
two multilateral agencies were also tied during this period because its priority 
was to rescue first its Latin American major debtor countries of Mexico in August 
1982 which defaulted followed by Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Ecuador and then the 
Philippines in 1983.60 Aggravating this situation for Viratawas that the U.S. was now 
shifting its support to Mrs. Aquino who it viewed as a pliable leader as compared 
to Marcos.61 This seemed to signal that politically and economically, U.S was 
withdrawing its support for the dictatorship and consequently, its technocrats.  
What aggravated this situation was Marcos chose to seek the assistance of 
Ongpin to help the country get out of the economic crisis stressing  a social capital 
where the same strong ties that help members of a group often enable it to exclude 
others (Portes and Landolt 1996).62 This was seen in the Virata faction’s exclusion 
from Ongpin’s network of financial assistance emanating from his Binondo63 
Central Bank (BCB), which was established through his network among the rich in 
the Chinese community.  “The so-called BCB referred to a group of major currency 
traders organized in November 1983 to provide badly needed dollars to importers, 
traders and large corporations that acquired raw materials and services” (Inquirer 
Research 2012, A22).  This came at the time when the country’s “banks and financial 
institutions had scarce foreign reserves due to the crippling debt crisis that followed 
the assassination of Benigno Aquino Jr.  (Inquirer Research 2012, A22).   According 
60 Virata, Cesar E.A.  2008.  Interview by Cayetano Paderanga and Teresa S. Encarnacion Tadem. Tape recording. 
30 September. RCBC Plaza, Makati City, Philippines.
61 Virata, Cesar E.A.  2008.  Interview by Cayetano Paderanga and Teresa S. Encarnacion Tadem. Tape recording. 
30 September. RCBC Plaza, Makati City, Philippines.
62 Thus “in industries with strong social ties, newcomers often find themselves unable to compete, no matter how 
good their skills and qualifications.”  (Portes and Landolt 1996).
63 Binondo refers to Chinatown in the Philippines.  It is a district in Manila.
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to Enrile, who led the 1986 People Power military coup against Marcos, the BCB 
was under the Project Luntian (Green) of the  National Intelligence Security 
Agency (Nisa). Nisa was under Armed Forces Chief of Staff General Fabian Ver 
who Ongpin worked closely with for this project (Yamsuan 2012, A22). This also 
highlighted Ongpin’s  close ties too with the military, something which the Virata 
faction did not have. Virata also said that Marcos relied on his crony Benedicto to 
raise the needed money, i.e., US$125 million for the country which Laya as Central 
Bank governor could not do. Virata surmised that Benedicto  probably called a 
number of people close to him and the  instrument used was the Dollar Treasury 
Bill.64 This highlights the nature of the networks which Benedicto had which the 
IMF/World Bank technocrats did not possess. In the process, the Virata faction, 
therefore, generally lost two of its important sources of its social capital, i.e., the 
support of the leadership and the IMF/World Bank. 
What ultimately sealed the Virata faction’s demise, was that, with the exception of 
Paterno, who left the Marcos government in 1980 and joined the anti-dictatorship 
movement and Sicat who joined the World Bank, technocracy was totally alienated 
and even went against another valuable social capital which  was undergoing a 
process of building and expanding new rights of participation of citizens (Putnam 
1993, 96). That is, the 1986 People Power Revolution which paved the way for the 
downfall of the Marcos dictatorship and consequently all of his technocrats.
Conclusion
This article, therefore, has shown the pertinence of exploring the nature of 
cultural/social capital in the making and unmaking of technocracy as a “power 
elite” in Philippine society. It particularly focused on how it facilitated  the 
emergence of the Virata faction of technocracy which was closely identified with 
the IMF/World Bank.  What paved the way for the entry of this technocracy bloc 
into the martial law regime were their family and educational backgrounds which 
enabled  them to acquire the technical expertise needed by the Philippine business 
community and later on by the government.  They came from the different classes of 
Philippine society.  In the case of Mapa, his family’s political and sugar landowning 
connections helped him secure a key role in the government. But for Virata, Mapa, 
Laya and Sicat, this was mainly the UP connection.  But what set apart the Virata 
faction from the other technocrats who possessed similar family and educational 
backgrounds and technical expertise was their shared economic vision with the 
leadership as well as the IMF/World Bank.  This led to their retention in the martial 
law administration unlike the other technocrats. This also enabled the growth of 
their social capital mainly as facilitator of international loans from donor countries 
and multilateral institutions.
64 Virata, Cesar E.A. 2008.  Interview by Yutaka Katayama, Cayetano Paderanga and Teresa S. Encarnacion Tadem. 
Tape recording.  June 24.  RCBC Plaza, Makati City, Philippines.
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 The martial law period, however, also showed how Marcos stymied the 
Virata faction’s social capital by doing the following:  1) he limited its social capital 
to the economic sphere and the Virata faction had nothing to do with politics; 
Marcos even got rid of “technopols” who he considered were “threatening”;’  2)  he 
factionalized technocracy thus it did not move as one power bloc;  3)  he encouraged 
a negative form of social capital through crony capitalism, as was particularly seen 
in his nurturing of two chief cronies, i.e., Cojuangco in the coconut industry and 
Benedicto in the sugar industry; and lastly 4)  he did not curtail the excesses of his 
wife Mrs. Marcos. All of these stymiedthe Virata faction’s social capital to pursue 
its economic policies.
 The political and economic crisis, however, also revealed the possibilities 
of how the Virata faction’s social capital could still grow as seen with the IMF/
World Bank pressure on the leadership to form a technocratic government headed 
by no less than Virata as Prime Minister. This was one way it believed that it 
could restrain patronage politics and corruption in the martial law regime.  The 
economic and political crisis of the early 1980s also gave some leverage for the 
Virata faction to institute reforms in exchange for financial assistance from these 
multilateral lending agencies. This was, however, short-lived as the Virata faction 
could not access all the financial assistance the country needed.  A major reason 
was that  IMF/World Bank gave priority in bailing out its bigger Latin American 
debtor countries. Furthermore, the emergence of Mrs. Aquino as an alternative to 
Marcos,  gave impetus for the U.S. to withdraw its support for the dictatorship, and 
consequentlys its technocrats.  Marcos thus shifted his dependence on the Virata 
faction to his other technocrat, Ongpin and chief crony, Benedicto to bring in the 
needed dollar reserves.  This only further depleted whatever social capital was left 
of an already emasculated Virata technocracy bloc.
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